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PUBLIC ACCESS AND THE CALIFORNIA
COASTAL COMMISSION: A QUESTION OF
OVERREACHING
I. INTRODUCTION
The seventies signaled the beginning of a decade in which
Californians would find new ways and means to acquire ac-
cess to the Pacific Ocean. The costs associated with acquiring
public accessways have traditionally been viewed as a govern-
mental expense paid by public funds. Decrying the use of con-
demnation proceedings or litigation to establish prescriptive
rights, the California Coastal Commission and six Regional
Commissions are employing a regulatory scheme presumably
authorized under recent coastal legislation,1 which shifts the
c 1981 by Kevin A. Johnson
1. In April 1976, the California State Legislature enacted the Coastal Act of
1976, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30000-30900 (West 1977 & Supp. 1980), a controversial
piece of legislation that was primarily aimed at the regulation of land use within the
coastal zone. The Coastal Act, to a large extent, was the Legislature's implementation
of the policies and recommendations of the California Coastal Zone Conservation
Plan (Coastal Plan) prepared by the California Coastal Commission (State Commis-
sion) pursuant to Proposition 20. The Act replaced the original Coastal Act of 1972,
an initiative measure passed by California voters by a 55 to 45 percent margin. When
Proposition 20 expired at the end of 1976, the provisions of the 1976 Act took effect.
With the passage of the 1976 Act, six temporary Regional Commissions and one ongo-
ing State Commission were established to exercise control over coastal development
permits. The Act also transferred the responsibility of preparing a coastal plan from
the commissions to each of the 15 counties and 53 cities along the coast. Each local
government is responsible for developing a Local Coastal Plan (LCP) which brings
local government plans and regulations into conformity with Coastal Act policies.
When reviewed and certified by the State Commission as consistent with the Coastal
Act, the LCP plan will become the coastal plan in that city or county. As such, the
review authority for new development will be returned to local governments thereby
phasing out the six Regional Commissions. The State Commission will continue to
exercise permit jurisdiction over certain kinds of development and will continue to
hear appeals and review amendments to certified LCP's. Every five years the State
Commission is required to review the progress of local governments in carrying out
the Coastal Act which will stay in effect. See generally REA Enterprises v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 52 Cal. App. 3d 596, 603-04, 125 Cal. Rptr. 201, 205-06 (1975); CAL.
PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30500-30525 (West 1977 & Supp. 1980); CAL. COASTAL COMM'N,
395
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acquisition costs of public accessways to the coastal developer.
This scheme largely parallels the subdivision exactions upheld
in Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek.' The
coastal developer is required to dedicate land for public access
to the beach as a precondition to approval of a coastal devel-
opment permit.
One might dismiss the seriousness of these outlays by
characterizing the coastal developer as a transient owner bent
on maximizing profits.$ However, closer investigation reveals
that the term "coastal developer" is not synonymous with the
terms "subdivider" and "land developer" as used in the tradi-
tional sense. The term "coastal developer" as used in this
comment derives its meaning from the Coastal Act's definition
of "development ' 4 which encompasses any conceivable struc-
ture built, placed, or repaired between the sea and the nearest
public road. Even where the terms "subdivider" and "land de-
veloper" are interchangeable with the term "coastal devel-
oper," the initial costs incurred by the subdivider are passed
on to individual lot owners. The bottom line is somewhat
alarming. Any person desiring to live on the coast or intensify
his use of ocean front property, whether a subdivider, condo-
minium owner, homeowner, or apartment dweller, is on notice
that he will be made to pay for the public's access to the
shoreline.
The State Commission and the six Regional Commissions
view public access as a "top priority" of the Coastal Act.5 As a
result, they have vigorously applied the public access policies
and provisions of the Act in an attempt to enhance and secure
a public accessway system along the California coastline.' The
commissions' enthusiastic application has been praised by
many environmental interest groups such as the Sierra Club's
Coastal Task Force and Coastwatch This same enthusiasm
BIENNIAL REPORT 1977-78.
2. 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878
(1971).
3. Cf. Johnston, Constitutionality of Subdivision Control Exactions: The Quest
for a Rationale, 52 CORNELL L. Q. 871, 923 (1967).
4. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30106 (West 1977). See note 134 infra.
5. CAL. COASTAL COMM'N, COASTAL NEWS, Nov. 1979, at 4.
6. CAL. COASTAL COMM'N, BIENNIAL REPORT 1977-78, at 1.
7. In the words of one Sierra Club Coastal Task Force representative speaking
at a public hearing before the State Commission:
[Olne of the greatest legacies of this Coastal Commission and the public
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has drawn heavy criticism from coastal residents, developers,
public interest groups, and local governments. One only need
attend a public hearing on a Local Coastal Plan (LCP), for
any one of the sixty-eight counties and cities engaged in the
preparation of LCP's, to surmise that a large number of these
individuals and groups feel the commissions' aggressive imple-
mentation of the access policies and provisions of the Act has
run afoul of the legislative intent and express language of the
Coastal Act. Sympathetic legislators have responded to these
complaints, heightening the controversy. During the 1979 leg-
islative session, two pieces of legislation were introduced
which would have abolished the State Commission and re-
turned permit controls under the Coastal Act to local govern-
ments,8 and precluded the State Commission from requiring
any LCP to include exactions from private property owners.'
In addition to these legislative efforts, coastal developers
subject to the access related provisions of the Coastal Act
have begun to mount an elaborate legal attack on the commis-
sions' regulatory scheme. 10 Developers and the Pacific Legal
Foundation (Foundation)1 have assailed the proclaimed con-
stitutional underpinning of the Act's access policies. 2 Some
developers are maintaining that the Legislature did not grant
involvement in its processes will be some kind of public trail running
from Oregon to Mexico unlike [sic] the Muir Trail in the mountains. We
think that's one of the greatest benefits this Commission could bestow
on present and future generations.
Administrative Record at 430, Georgia-Pacific, Inc. v. California Coastal Comm'n No.
74459 (San Francisco County Super. Ct. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Administrative
Record Georgia-Pacific].
8. Senate Const. Amend. 25, Reg. Seas. (1979-1980) (died without a floor vote).
9. S.B. 714, Reg. Seas. (1979-1980) (died in committee).
10. The hesitation on the part of developers can be attributed to the "economic
realities" of protracted litigation and the "wait and see" attitude that prevailed with
the earlier interim measure known as Proposition 20. Faced with a permanent coastal
management program and the prospect of increased regulation at the local level a
number of developers have initiated litigation as a last resort. Conversation with
Sherman Stacy, (Jan. 28, 1980), attorney for plaintiffs, Benton v. South Coast Re-
gional Comm'n, No. 238910 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. 1978). See D. HAGMAN &
D. MISCZYNSKI, WINDFALLS FOR WIPEoUTs: LAND VALUE CAPTURE AND COMPENSATION
347-48 (1978).
11. The Pacific Legal Foundation is a not-for-profit tax-exempt corporation
organized and existing under the laws of California for the purpose of engaging in
litigation in matters affecting the broad public interest.
12. Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Comm'n, No. 26824 (Los
Angeles County Super. Ct. 1980). See Benton v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, No.
23890 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. 1978).
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the commissions the power to require the dedication of access
as a condition to development when it enacted the public ac-
cess component of the present Act."8 Others claim that the
commissions are acting in excess of their statutory authority
by requiring dedications prohibited by the express language of
the enabling provision.1' Along the same lines, the Foundation
has also challenged the State Commission's newly adopted
"Statewide Interpretive Guidelines on Public Access" (Access
Guidelines) as being inconsistent with the access provisions of
the Coastal Act.15
Recognizing these challenges and that local governments
are in the midst of preparing LCP's which must be in con-
formity with the Coastal Act, the Act's access policies will be
explored for the purpose of delimiting their requirements and
prohibitions. This comment will also inquire into whether the
access policies are constitutionally based and whether they
authorize the commissions to condition coastal development
upon the dedication of access or upon the payment of a fee in
lieu thereof. After concluding that there is no apparent consti-
tutional foundation for the enactment of the access policies
and that the commissions are restricted to requiring access
dedications, the comment will examine the limited nature of
that authority. Finding that the enabling provision contains
three inherent prohibitions, this comment will review the
State Commission's Access Guidelines, highlighting the appar-
ent inconsistencies. To better illustrate these inconsistencies,
this comment examines the access conditions imposed on one
developer's coastal development permit.
13. Benton v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, No. 23890 (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. 1978); Isthmus Landowners Ass'n v. California Coastal Comm'n, No.
229279 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. 1978).
14. Isthmus Landowners Ass'n v. California Coastal Comm'n, No. 229279 (Los
Angeles County Super. Ct. 1978); Georgia-Pacific, Inc. v. California Coastal Comm'n,
No. 744590 (San Francisco County Super. Ct. 1979).
15. Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Comm'n, No. 268254 (Los
Angeles County Super. Ct. 1980). The ultimate resolution of this case may have far
reaching consequences. The Access Guidelines constitute the State Commission's in-
terpretation of the access requirements of the Coastal Act and for all practical pur-
poses are the primary means by which the commissions and local governments will
implement their public accessway programs. CAL. COASTAL COMM'N, SUPPLEMENTS TO
LocAL COASTAL PROGRAM MANUAL INFORMATION ON COASTAL SHORELINE AccEss POLI-
cias (1979) [hereinafter cited as LocAL COASTAL PROGRAM MANUAL SuPP.J.
[Vol. 21
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE PUBLIC ACCESS COMPONENT
The 1976 Coastal Act is the most comprehensive and
novel piece of environmental legislation enacted in California
in the last decade. The Act was the center of debate in the
Legislature and was passed only because of the last minute
efforts of some environmentally minded legislators and lobby-
ists.1 In the struggle to pass the Act some of the more contro-
versial provisions were the product of legislative compromise.
As a result, some of these provisions contain language which is
ambiguous or lacking any discernable legislative intent, lead-
ing to the basic unworkability of the provision. Other provi-
sions fail to define key terms. This is particularly evident in
the public access component of the Act, specifically sections
30210, 30211 and 30212,17 the gateway provisions to the com-
ponent which presumably enable the commissions to require
the dedication of accessways.
In an apparent attempt to cure any deficiencies in the Act
which might become evident when the policies and provisions
of the Act were applied, the Legislature charged the State
Commission with the responsibility for promulgating "Inter-
pretive Guidelines." 18 These guidelines were "designed to as-
16. A brief legislative history of the Coastal Act underscores that conflict:
The original coastal bill, SB 1579 was introduced in the Senate in Feb-
ruary 1976. After several hearings, the bill was approved in one commit-
tee but in June 1976, it failed to clear the Senate Finance Committee.
For awhile it seemed as if coastal legislation was dead until next year,
when the bill was quickly reviewed as amendments to a minor bill, SB
1277, [which] had already received Senate hearings and approval. In two
months SB 1277 emerged from both houses of the Legislature as the
basis of California's coastal management program.
U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA COASTAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAM AND
FINANCIAL IMPACT STATEMENT 18 (1977). 0
17. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30210-30212 (West Supp. 1980). Section 30210
provides:
In carrying out the requirement of Section 4 of Article X of the Califor-
nia Constitution, maximum access, which shall be conspicuously posted,
and recreational opportunities shall be provided for all the people con-
sistent with public safety needs and the need to protect public rights,
rights of private property owners, and natural resource areas from
overuse.
Section 30211 provides:
Development shall not interfere with the public's right of access to the
sea where acquired through use or legislative authorization, including,
but not limited to, the use of dry sand and rocky coastal beaches to the
first line of terrestrial vegetation.
18. Id. § 30620(a)(3) (West 1977).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
sist local governments, the regional commissions, the commis-
sion and persons subject to the [development control]
provisions. . . in determining how the policies of this division
[the Act] shall be applied in the coastal zone prior to certifica-
tion of local coastal programs .. "is Access Guidelines were
desperately needed by the commissions who were given the
mandate that they "maximize access ' '2 without any real stan-
dards for determining when access conditions are warranted
and the extent to which they are required."1 A close examina-
tion of the Access Guidelines reveals, however, that the State
Commission did more than merely "assist" concerned parties.
The State Commission essentially rewrote the public access
component of the Act, particularly section 30212, misinter-
preting the apparent meaning and intent of its terms and
phrases, and in one instance exceeding its expressed
authority.
The definitional shortcomings of the public access compo-
nent are further accentuated by the Legislature's and commis-
sions' misinterpretation of the meaning and effect of article X,
section 4 (formerly article XV, section 2) of the California
Constitution," and the so called "constitutional right of ac-
cess" which emanates from this provision. This frequently
misconstrued enactment is the mislaid cornerstone of the
public access component.
19. Id.
20. Id. § 30001.5 (West Supp. 1980) in part states that one of the "basic goals of
the state for the coastal zone" is to: "Maximize public access to and along the coast
...consistent with sound resources conservation principles and constitutionally pro-
tected rights of private property owners." (emphasis added).
21. See CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 30214 (West Supp. 1980). The Legislature re-
cently enacted this section to require the commissions to take "into account the need
to regulate the time, place, and manner of public access depending on the facts and
circumstances of each case." While this section requires the commission to "regulate"
access, they are still without statutory standards for determining when access condi-
tions are warranted at the outset. The only standard in the Act, if any, is that the
access condition imposed be "reasonable." Id. § 30607 (West 1977). This begs the
question. What is "reasonable," and what criteria are necessary in making that deter-
mination? See CAL. COASTAL COMM'N, STATEWIDE INTERPRETIVE GUIDELINES ON PUBLIC
ACCESS (Feb. 20, 1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 AccEss GUIDELINES], which suggests
that the key to the reasonableness standard lies in the construction of the term "new
development projects" as used in section 30212.
22. See text accompanying note 51 infra.
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III. ABSENCE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERPINNING FOR THE
ACCESS POLICIES OF THE COASTAL ACT
Perhaps the most pressing challenge to the public access
component of the Act concerns the alleged absence of any
constitutional foundation for the Act's access policies con-
tained in sections 30210, 30211, and 30212. The State Com-
mission maintains that the Legislature enacted the access
policies of the Act in an attempt to carry out the mandate of
article X, section 4.2 Developers and the Pacific Legal Foun-
dation argue that this constitutional enactment cannot pro-
vide the commissions with the legislative basis for requiring
access dedications from upland developers."' Such a claim, if
successfully demonstrated, would significantly undermine the
access conditioning powers presumably granted in section
30212(a).
The repercussions of a finding that there is no constitu-
tional basis for the access dedications required of upland
coastal developers are noteworthy. Such a finding would simi-
larly stand for a rejection of the public's constitutional right
of access over uplands to navigable waters. Access conditions
imposed pursuant to sections 30210, 30211, and 30212 would
not be accorded the same degree of deference accorded regula-
tions designed to promote or safeguard a state constitutional
right.25 Rather, the character and constitutional validity of the
commissions' regulatory activity would be evaluated solely as
a traditional exercise of the state's police power.6 Moreover,
23. Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 68, Pacific Legal
Foundation, Inc. v. California Coastal Comm'n, No. 268254 (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Cal. Coastal Comm'n Memorandum); 1980
AccEss GUIDELINES, supra note 21, at 1.
24. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 33-34, Georgia-Pacific,
Inc. v. California Coastal Comm'n, No. 744590 (San Francisco Super. Ct. 1979) [here-
inafter cited as Georgia-Pacific Memorandum]; Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points
and Authorities at 32-41, Benton v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, No. 238910 (Los
Angeles County Super. Ct. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Benton Memorandum]; Plain-
tiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 22-34, Pacific Legal Foundation v.
California Coastal Comm'n, No. 268254 (Los Angeles Super. Ct. 1980) [hereinafter
cited as Pacific Legal Foundation Memorandum].
25. See Chow v. City of Santa Barbara, 217 Cal. 673, 701, 22 P.2d 5, 16 (1933).
Compare Lane v. City of Redondo Beach, 49 Cal. App. 3d 251, 255-57, 122 Cal. Rptr.
189, 192-94 (1975) with Sea Ranch Ass'n v. California Coastal Comm'n, No. C-74-
1320 (N.D. Cal. April 7, 1981) and Frisco Land & Mining Co. v. California, 74 Cal.
App. 3d 736, 753-54, 141 Cal. Rptr. 820, 830-31 (1977).
26. To condition upland coastal development upon the provision of public ac-
cess has been held to be within the scope of the state's police power to reasonably
19811
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the commissions' regulatory activity could not be justified
under the auspice of protecting the "public's right of access,"
regulate the use of property for the protection of the public health, safety, and gen-
eral welfare. Sea Ranch Ass'n v. California Coastal Comm'n, No. C-74-1320 (N.D. Cal.
April 7, 1981); Frisco Land & Mining Co. v. California, 74 Cal. App. 3d 736, 753-54,
141 Cal. Rptr. 820, 830-31 (1977). The larger question, however, is whether such con-
ditions go so far as to amount to a taking under the particular facts and circum-
stances of each case. E.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174-75 (1979).
Under federal takings analysis, several factors have been identified as having par-
ticular significance in determining whether governmental action effects a taking of
private property. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124-28
(1978). Of the several factors enumerated by the Court in Penn Central, two have the
most relevance in evaluating a taking challenge to the imposition of access conditions:
1) the character of the governmental action (i.e. whether it can be characterized as "a
physical invasion by government," as "reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a
substantial public purpose," or as "an acquisition of resources to permit or facilitate
uniquely public functions") and 2) whether the attempted regulation interferes with
reasonable investment-backed expectations. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S. 164, 175-80 (1979).
In Kaiser Aetna the government attempted to create a public right of access by
requesting an injunction, which the Court of Appeals granted, to require the devel-
oper of a marina-styled subdivision community to allow public access to the waters of
the marina (Kuapa Pond). The government claimed that the petitioners could not
exclude the public from Kuapa Pond because they had a right of access over those
waters by virtue of the federal navigational servitude over navigable waters of the
United States. Id. at 170. After examining the two factors mentioned above, the Su-
preme Court rejected this claim, despite finding Kuapa Pond was navigable and sub-
ject to Congress' power to regulate navigable waters and promote navigation. Id. at
172. The Court first noted that the government's attempt to create a public access
right was tenuously connected to the promotion of the purposes of the navigational
servitude. Id. at 178. Then the Court proceeded to find that the "right to exclude"
was such an important investment-backed expectancy on the part of Kaiser Aetna
that it fell within the category of property interests which cannot be taken without
just compensation. Id. at 179-80. Kaiser Aetna's investment of "substantial amounts
of money in making improvements" was justified on the grounds of the government's
prior acquiescence in the unconditional dredging of Kuapa Pond. Id. at 176, 179. In
closing, the Court further characterized the governmental action by finding that if
carried out it would "result in an actual physical invasion of the privately owned
marina," an intrusion which apparently would itself require the payment of just com-
pensation. Id. at 180.
Cases involving a taking challenge to the access conditions imposed upon upland
development will require a consideration of the factors addressed in Penn Central.
The creation of a right of public access, whether over navigable waters or uplands
adjacent thereto, will result in an actual physical invasion of privately owned prop-
erty. This is an important, if not dispositive, factor. Compare Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S.
at 178 & n.9 and Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 with Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 180
(citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 265 (1946); Portsmith Co. v. United
States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922)). Whether the condition interferes with reasonable invest-
ment-backed expectations will turn on the nature, extent, and timing of the devel-
oper's investment, provided that the investment leads to the fruitation of expectan-
cies constituting recognized property interests. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 179; Penn
Central, 438 U.S. at 124-25.
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as defined in section 30211, since the commissions cannot pro-
tect that which does not exist." Lastly, the public would not
have the right, nor would the commissions have the corre-
sponding obligation, to control coastal uplands for public ac-
cess purposes as a matter of public right.28 Denied standing to
challenge a proposed upland development on the grounds that
it interfered with a right of public access," the public would
be forced to rely on the regulatory powers of the commissions
as a means to guarantee public access.
A. Common Law Right of Public Access Across Public Trust
Lands
Because the ebb and flow of the tide ultimately plays an
integral role in defining the scope of the public's common law
and constitutional right of access to the ocean, the distinction
between upland and tideland areas must be drawn.' 0 In Cali-
fornia, as in those states following the common law rule, the
mean high tide line or ordinary high water mark separates
tidelands from upland areas.'1 Uplands are therefore com-
prised of the dry-sand area and the land area landward of the
vegetation line."8 Tidelands are lands lying between the mean
27. See note 68 infra.
28. See California v. Superior Court ex rel. Fogerty, No. 24035 (Cal. Sup. Ct.
March 20, 1981) (emphasis added):
A number of considerations advanced by plaintiffs and-amicus would
call also for abdication of the tidelands trust and the substitution of
regulation of tidelands development for the concept of the public's right
to control such lands as a matter of right....
The exercise of the police power has proved insufficient to protect
the shorezone. The urgent need to prevent deterioration and disappear-
ance of this fragile resource provides ample justification for our conclu-
sion that the People may not be estopped from asserting the rights of
the public in those lands.
29. See Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 261-62, 491 P.2d 374, 381-82, 98 Cal.
Rptr. 790, 797-98 (1971); Lafargue, Practical Legal Remedies to the Public Beach
Shortage, 5 ENVIONMENTAL AFFAIRS 447, 469 (1976).
30. One might argue that since navigability has recently been held to be the
"touchstone in determining whether the public trust applies," navigability is a more
appropriate gauge by which to define the scope of the public's right of access. Califor-
nia v. Superior Court ex rel. Lyon, No. 33981 (Cal. Sup. Ct. March 20, 1981). None-
theless, the meaning of the term "navigable waters," as applied to the coastline, is
largely synonomous with "tidewaters." See 65 C.J.S. Navigable Waters § 4 (1966).
31. 1 R. CLARK, WATRRS AND WATER RIGHTS § 36.3(c) (1967).
32. Some commentators distinguish the dry-sand area from the area landward
of the vegetation line which they refer to as "uplands." Comment, Hawaiian Beach
Access, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 823, 824 n.11 (1975); Note, Public Access to Beaches, 22
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high and mean low tides.33 Submerged lands, for purposes of
discussion, will include all lands extending three miles sea-
ward of the mean low tide line,"' although they technically re-
fer to all lands of the ocean floor lying seaward of the mean
low tide.3 5 The shorezone is comprised of those lands between
the high and low water levels in nontidal, navigable lakes and
streams.30
As a general rule, all tidelands, submerged lands, and the
shorezone are subject to a public easement and servitude for
purposes of commerce, navigation, and fisheries, commonly
referred to as the jus publicum87 Fee title to these trust lands
and navigable waterways belongs to the state as an attribute
of its sovereignty and is held in public trust for the benefit of
all the people of the state.3" As trustee, the state has the abso-
lute power and obligation to manage these trust lands for the
benefit of the trust's beneficiaries, 9 subject only to the re-
strictions imposed by the federal and state constitutions, spe-
cifically sections 3 and 4 of the 1879 California Constitution. 0
The public's rights under California's public trust doc-
trine include the right to use trust lands and navigable water-
STAN. L. REv. 564, 565 & n.5 (1970). However, such a distinction is called for only in
those states, like Oregon, where the public enjoys a right to use the dry-sand area.
State ex rel. Thronton v. Hay, 254 Ore. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969).
33. People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 583, 138 P. 79, 82 (1913); White
v. California, 21 Cal. App. 3d 738, 742, 99 Cal. Rptr. 58, 60 (1971); Carr v. Kingsbury,
111 Cal. App. 165, 168, 295 P. 586, 587 (1931).
34. Congress quitclaimed all lands three miles seaward of the "ordinary high
water mark" to the states with the passage of the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43
U.S.C. §§ 1301-1343 (1976), thereby adding these lands to the corpus of the public's
tidelands trust. See People v. Hecker, 179 Cal. App. 2d 823, 835-36, 4 Cal. Rptr. 334,
341-42 (1960); R. CLARK, supra note 31, § 36.3(b).
35. People v. Hecker, 179 Cal. App. 2d 823, 835, 4 Cal. Rptr. 334, 341 (1960).
See Carr v. Kingsbury, 111 Cal. App. 165, 168, 295 P. 586, 587 (1931).
36. California v. Superior Court ex rel. Lyon No. 23981 (Cal. Sup. Ct. March 20,
1981).
37. Illinois C. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 415 (1892); California v. Superior
Court ex rel. Lyon, No. 23981 (Cal. Sup. Ct. March 20, 1981); People v. California
Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 584, 593, 138 P. 79, 82, 86 (1913) (citing Oakland v. Oakland
Waterfront Co., 118 Cal. 160, 183, 50 P. 277, 285 (1897)); People v. Gold Run Ditch &
Mining Co., 66 Cal. 138, 151-52, 4 P. 1152, 1159 (1884).
38. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935); People v. California Fish Co.,
166 Cal. 576, 584, 138 P. 79, 82 (1913).
39. E.g., Colberg, Inc. v. California, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 416, 432 P.2d 3, 10, 62 Cal.
Rptr. 401, 408 (1967).
40. Id. at 416, 419, 432 P.2d at 9-11, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 408; People v. California
Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 587-88, 138 P. 79, 83-84 (1913); Parker, History, Politics and
the Law of the California Tidelands Trust, 41 W. ST. U.L. Rav. 149, 159 (1977).
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ways for the following: traditional trust purposes such as navi-
gation, commerce, and fishing; general recreational uses such
as hunting, bathing, and swimming; and environmental uses,
including the preservation of tidelands in their natural state.41
Incident to the right of navigation, commerce, fishery, and
recreation is the right of public ingress and egress over trust
lands-the right of public access.4 ' Although the scope of this
common law right of public access is tied directly to the per-
missible uses of trust lands, these uses are not unchanging. 3
Nevertheless, the trust and the public right of access arising
thereunder are inapplicable to uplands since California never
acquired title .to lands landward of the mean high tide.4'
During the last half of the eighteenth century the state of
California sold thousands of acres of. tidelands along the
coastline to private individuals.4 5 In some instances these con-
veyances freed these tidelands from the public easement and
servitude which existed over these lands by virtue of Califor-
nia's public trust doctrine.46 One of the more hard felt conse-
quences of freeing tideland of the public trust was the extin-
guishment of the common law right of public access across
trust lands and the right of free navigation over navigable
waterways.4'7 Article X, section 4 of the California Constitu-
tion was adopted primarily to restrict the plenary power of
the state to alienate tidelands in promotion of the purposes of
the public trust by making it unlawful for an alienee to ob-
41. See, e.g., City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 521, 606 P.2d
362, 365, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327, 330 (1980).
42. See, e.g., Bohn v. Alberston, 107 Cal. App. 2d 738, 749-50, 238 P.2d 128, 136
(1951).
43. See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 259, 491 P.2d 374, 380, 98 Cal.
Rptr. 790, 796 (1971) (citation omitted) ("the public uses to which tidelands are sub-ject are sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public needs").
44. See City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Properties, No. 56383 (2d Dist.
Ct. App. March 25, 1981).
45. "Perhaps 80,000 acres of tidelands (as distinguished from submerged lands)
were conveyed to private parties before California Fish was decided [in 1913]." City
of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 524 n.9, 606 P.2d 362, 367, 162 Cal.
Rptr. 327, 332 (1980) (citation omitted).
46. See, e.g., Eldridge v. Cowell, 4 Cal. 80, 87 (1854). The state has the author-
ity as manager of the public trust to free tidelands and submerged lands from the
public trust by one of two methods: "First, the legislature may determine and declare
that certain trust lands are no longer essential for purposes of commerce, navigation
and fisheries; second, the legislature may pass statutes enacted in aid of commerce,
navigation and fisheries." Parker, supra note 40, at 159.
47. See, e.g., Forestier v. Johnson, 164 Cal. 24, 31-32, 127 P. 156, 159 (1912).
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struct or interfere with the public's free access across tide-
lands and its free navigation over navigable waterways."' The
enactment effectively assured that the common law right of
free public access and free navigation could not be extin-
guished by any state sale of tidelands."'
B. Article X, Section 4 of the California Constitution
1. Constitutional Right of Access Across Trust Lands
Article X, section 4 was one of three provisions adopted
during the Constitutional Convention of 1879 which sought to
remedy the abuses which grew out of the mismanagement and
sale of public tidelands by the state after California gained
statehood in 1850.50 Section 4 provides:
No individual, partnership, or corporation, claiming
or possessing the frontage or tidal lands of a harbor, bay,
inlet, estuary, or other navigable water in this state shall
be permitted to exclude the right of way to such water
whenever it is required for any public purpose, nor to de-
stroy or obstruct the free navigation of such water; and
the Legislature shall enact such laws as will give the most
liberal construction to this provision, so that access to the
navigable waters of this State shall be always attainable
for the people thereof."
To examine the scope of the so called "constitutional
right of access" which emanates from this provision, it is best
divided into two subparts: 1) a substantive element re-
48. Id. at 34, 127 P. at 160:
The legislature is without power to dispose of the tide lands of the state
in a manner which would conflict with this provision of the constitution,
or to provide for the alienation of a greater estate in such lands than
that provision would permit. The provision is that no person possessing
tidal lands of a bay, estuary, or other navigable water, whether the pos-
session be lawful or unlawful, can be permitted to obstruct the free navi-
gation thereof. The power of the legislature is limited by the provisions
of the constitution, which are mandatory and prohibitory. Therefore, if
it can dispose of, or authorize the disposition of, the underlying soil to
private ownership, it cannot thereby authorize the alienee to obstruct
the free navigation of such water.
49. Id.
50. Debates and Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the State of
California 1038-39 (1880) [hereinafter cited as Constitutional Debates]; Bohner &
Martin, The Loss of Public Tidelands to Private Parties Through Unconstitutional
Land Trades, 13 U.S.F. L. REv. 39 (1978-79).
51. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 4 (formerly art. XV, § 2).
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straining grantees of tide and submerged lands from denying
access to navigable waters, and 2) a mandate from the conven-
tion to the Legislature to liberally construe the measure. If
the former is so broad as to encompass the right of public ac-
cess over privately owned upland areas, then the commissions
clearly have a constitutional basis for requiring access dedica-
tions as a precondition to development. However, if the provi-
sion is limited to a constitutional right of public access over
tide and submerged lands,'5 as will be shown, then the consti-
tutional source of the commission's authority necessarily rests
with the mandate. The failure of the State Commission, de-
velopers, and the Foundation to differentiate between the
substance subpart and the mandate has generated considera-
ble confusion as to the scope of the public's constitutional
right of access" and has jeopardized the viability of the access
policies of the Act.
The substantive element of section 4 states that no pri-
vate person or entity "claiming or possessing the frontage or
tidal lands"" shall deny public access to, or the free naviga-
tion of, any navigable or tidal waters. The terms "frontage"
and "tidal lands" limit the prohibition to application against
grantees of tidelands and the shorezone. Although the term
"frontage" has no prescribed meaning under the public trust
doctrine, it is clear that the term, as used on the floor of the
constitutional convention, did not refer to areas landward of
the mean high tide line, or the high water level in a nontidal,
navigable lake or stream." Throughout the heated constitu-
52. The public will rarely exercise a right of access over submerged lands as
they are by definition ordinarily covered by tidewaters. See text accompanying notes
31-35 supra.
53. 1 RALPH NADER TASK FORCE, POWER AND LAND IN CALIFORNIA IV-130 (1971);
Note, Californians Need Beaches-Maybe Yours!, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 605, 606-07
(1970). But see CAL. COASTAL ZONE CONSERVATION COMM'NS, CAL. COASTAL PLAN 152-
55 (1975). In its findings on "Public Access To The Coast" the commissions stated
that the "right of public access to all coastal tidelands is guaranteed by the Califor-
nia Constitution and has been expanded in scope by various statutes and court deci-
sions." Id. at 152 (emphasis added).
54. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 4 (formerly art. XV, § 2) (emphasis added).
55. 2, 3 Constitutional Debates, supra note 50, at 1038-39, 1478-81. Cf. Carr v.
Kingsbury, 111 Cal. App. 165, 169-72, 295 P. 586, 588-89 (1931) (construing section 4
of Leasing Act of 1921 which prohibited permits or leases "covering tide, overflowed
or submerged lands fronting on an incorporating city"); Joyner v. Kingsbury, 97 Cal.
App. 17, 18-21, 275 P. 255, 256-57 (1929) (construing section 4 of the Leasing Act of
1921). But see 41 Ops. Cal. Att'y Gen. 39, 41 (1963) (construing "frontage" in section
4 to include beaches in municipal ownership which were not tide or submerged
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tional debate which occured prior to the adoption of the arti-
cle or "Harbors, Tide Waters, and Navigable Streams," the
terms "tidelands" and "frontages" were used interchangea-
bly.56 The opening language of article X, section 357 (formerly
article XV, section 3), which is identical to the language
adopted at the constitutional convention of 1879, underscores
that land fronting navigable waterways or frontages is synony-
mous with tidelands. Moreover, since the state is also capable
of mismanaging the public trust in the shorezone by disposing
of such lands to the exclusion of the public,58 the shorezone is
very susceptible to being viewed as coming within the mean-
ing of a "frontage land ... of a ... navigable water."5 9
Given the above construction of the physical area subject
to the restrictions of the substantive subpart of section 4, the
enactment does not prohibit private landowners from denying
public access over upland areas. Rather, it operates to provide
a public constitutional easement over certain tide and sub-
merged lands. 0 To reiterate, this easement entails both a
lands).
56. The debate, quoted below, which ensued after one legislator moved to strike
article X, § 3 (formerly art. XV, § 3) is illustrative:
MR. HERRINGTON. Mr. Chairman: I am just as much in favor of pre-
serving the rights of the people to frontages as anybody else in the
world; but it does strike me if this constitutional provision is adopted
there will be no such thing as the reclamation of these tide lands for the
purpose of constructing towns. . . . I am perfectly willing to place re-
strictions in every way to protect these frontages, but to say that all tide
lands within two miles of an incorporated city or town in this state shall
be withheld from grant or sale, it seems to me is not proper in a consti-
tutional provision.
MR. WEST. Mr. Chairman: I hope that the section will not be
stricken out. . . .Now, whether these rights exist for individuals or cor-
porations makes no difference. These frontages are held in this state to
the exclusion of lawful traffic across these tide lands to the salt water.
2 Constitutional Debates, supra note 50, at 1438 (emphasis added) (the motion lost
by a 34-54 vote).
57. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 3 provides in pertinent part:
All tidelands within two miles of any incorporated city, city and county,
or town in this state, and fronting on the water of any harbor, estuary,
bay, or inlet used for the purposes of navigation, shall be withheld from
grant or sale to private persons, partnerships, or corporations . . ..
58. See Constitutional Debates, supra note 50, at 1481.
59. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 4 (formerly art. XV, § 2).
60. See Atwood v. Hammond, 4 Cal. 2d 31, 42, 48 P.2d 20, 25 (1935); People v.
California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 598, 138 P.2d 79, 88 (1913); Forestier v. Johnson,
164 Cal. 24, 35, 127 P. 156, 160 (1912).
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right of public access across tidelands and the shorezone and
the right of free navigation on waters overlying public trust
lands. Whether the enactment has application against only
those tide and submerged lands where the public navigational
servitude has not been effectively determined by the state"'
and where title to such lands has not been conveyed in fee
simple absolute as of the adoption of the 1879 constitution
remains unresolved. However, it has been suggested that this
is the "logical interpretation" of section 4.61
2. The Most Liberal Construction of Section 4
The mandate contained in the second subpart of section
4, that the "Legislature shall enact such laws as will give the
most liberal construction to this provision, so that access to
navigable waters of this State shall be always attainable for
the people thereof,"63 must provide the constitutional basis
for the access requirements contained in section 30212(a). The
State Commission claims that this language constitutes a
"constitutional provision mandating that access to public
tidelands be maximized."' By substituting the term "public
tidelands" for "navigable waters" the State Commission has
transmuted this mandate into a strong public policy in favor
of securing public access over tidelands and uplands. Thus,
the State Commission argues that this policy was carried out
by the Legislature when it enacted the access policies." De-
velopers and the Foundation argue that although section 4
may constitute a policy in favor of maximum access to the
shoreline, it does not authorize the commissions to condition
development upon the provision of access over upland areas. 66
The text of sections 30210 and 30211 reveal 67 that the
Legislature enacted the access policies in an attempt to carry
out what it perceived to be the mandate of section 4-the
maximization of public access to public tidelands and the
61. See note 46 supra.
62. Parker, supra note 40, at 171.
63. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 4 (formerly art. XV, § 2) (emphasis added).
64. 1980 ACCESS GUIDELINES, supra note 21, at 3.
65. Id. at 2-3. Cal. Coastal Comm'n Memorandum, supra note 23, at 68, 70, 85.
66. Pacific Legal Foundation Memorandum, supra note 24, at 26-30; Benton
Memorandum supra note 24, at 32.
67. See note 17 supra.
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sea. e8 Furthermore, section 30211 confirms that the Legisla-
ture misinterpreted the extent of the public's constitutional
right of access. The Legislature viewed the substantive sub-
part of section 4 as the "legislative authorization" which es-
tablished the public's right of access to the sea which includes
"the use of dry sand and rocky coastal beaches to the first line
of terrestrial vegetation." 9 In short, the public's right of ac-
cess was incorrectly interpreted as encompassing a right of ac-
cess over uplands.70 With the public's right of access thus de-
fined, the Legislature's interpretation of the mandate is
necessarily suspect. The question that remains is whether the
Legislature went beyond the "most liberal construction" of
section 4 when it enacted the access policies. 1
C. The Availability of the Remedy of Eminent Domain
Judicial interpretation of section 4 has been limited to
prohibiting tideland grantees from filling in lands subject to
tidal action or from interfering with the public easement ap-
purtenant to the public's navigational servitude.7 To date, no
case has extended the applicability of the provision beyond
tideland areas. Nonetheless, the State Commission maintains
that when the strong public policy to assure access to naviga-
ble waters is liberally construed it may be utilized as the basis
of the state's police power for the public access requirements
of the Act.7 Certainly, the actions of upland developers in the
68. The statutory reference in section 30211 to section 4 is found in the words
"legislative authorization." Under section 30211, the public's right of access, where
acquired through legislative authorization, is stated to include a right-of-way over
upland areas (i.e., dry sand and rocky coastal beaches). See CAL. COASTAL COMM'N,
STATEWIDE INTERPRETIVE GUIDELINES OF PUBLIC AccEss 3 (Aug. 3, 1979) (amended
Feb. 20, 1980) [hereinafter cited as 1979 AccEss GUIDELINES).
69. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30211 (West Supp. 1980). See also CAL. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 2, § 2551 (1977); CAL. COASTAL ZONE CONSERVATION COMM'NS COASTAL PLAN 152-
55 (1975).
70. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
71. The Foundation has framed the issue in terms of whether the commissions
have improperly construed the mandate directed to the Legislature. Pacific Legal
Foundation Memorandum, supra note 24, at 22-34. However, the construction that
the right of public access to the sea includes the passage over upland areas is clearly
the Legislature's interpretation of section 4.
72. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
73. Cal. Coastal Comm'n Memorandum, supra note 23, at 74. CAL. PUB. RES.
CODE § 30001 (West 1977) reveals that the provisions of the 1976 Coastal Act were
enacted for the purpose of promoting the public health, safety, and welfare. The Act
was therefore enacted in furtherance of the state's police powers, an alternative legis-
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aggregate could effectively foreclose the public from gaining
access to the Pacific Ocean in apparent contravention of the
closing words of section 4.4 Moreover, the abuses committed
in the disposition of tidelands belonging to the state prior to
1879 prompted the enactment of the substantive subpart of
section 4.75
Two major stumbling blocks to this liberal construction
must be cleared before the mandate can be found as the basis
for the Commission's authority to require access dedications
from upland owners. First, by its own terms, the liberal con-
struction directive of the mandate is to be afforded to section
4,76 not to the policy of forever assuring public access to navi-
gable waters. Since the purpose of section 4 was to limit state
grants of tide and submerged lands prejudicial to the public
trust, even the most liberal construction would fail to elimi-
nate the distinction between public trust lands and privately
owned uplands." Second, to alleviate the foreclosure of public
access by upland development, the state could exercise its
sovereign power of eminent domain to condemn any privately
owned uplands necessary for public trust purposes. In the ab-
sence of any case interpreting section 4 as affording a consti-
tutional public easement over privately owned uplands, two
post-1879 California Supreme Court decisions, Oakland v.
Oakland Waterfront Co.7 and Bolsa Land Co. v. Burdick,79
indicate that the public's rights in trust lands does not entitle
the public to a free access way across privately owned
lative basis for the enactment of the access policies. See note 116 infra.
74. Note, supra note 53, at 608-09. See CAL. COASTAL ZONE CONSERVATION
COMM'NS, CAL. COASTAL PLAN 152 (1975).
75. Those abuses included the monopolization of lands and wharves on the
frontages of navigable waters, the extortion practiced by tideland grantees, and the
outright exclusion of the public from tidelands. 3 Constitutional Debates, supra note
50, at 1523.
76. Section 4 states that the "[legislature] shall enact such laws as will give the
most liberal construction to this provision . CAL. CONST. art. X, § 4 (formerly
art. XV, § 2) (emphasis added).
77. The State Commission, by omitting the words "to this provision," interprets
section 4 to require the Legislature to give the most liberal construction to the public
policy of assuring access to navigable waters. Cal. Coastal Comm'n Memorandum,
supra note 23, at 76. A more logical interpretation would be that this public policy is
not the means of assuring access but rather the end to be achieved by a liberal con-
struction of the constitutional right of public access over trust lands guaranteed in
the substantive subpart of section 4.
78. 118 Cal. 160, 50 P. 277 (1897).
79. 151 Cal. 254, 90 P. 532 (1907).
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uplands.
The central question in Oakland Waterfront involved the
validity of a land grant by the state in 1852 to the newly in-
corporated City of Oakland of "lands lying ... between [the]
high tide and ship channel." 80 Applying a strict construction
of these words, Justice Beatty concluded that the grant was
limited to a "strip of land bounded by the lines of ordinary
high and low tide, and extending along the [Oakland] estuary
and bay front of the town. . . ...8 The court rejected an in-
terpretation of the grant which would have embraced close to
eight thousand acres including all the lands underlying the es-
tuary to the low tide line on the opposite side of the estuary.
This construction was refuted, in part, on the grounds that
the communities on that opposite side "had a natural right to
the common use of this body of navigable water, [and] to un-
restricted access to its shores . . . fully equal to that of the
people of Oakland."82 The decision discussed the power of the
legislature to alienate trust lands and acknowledged that the
public's "unrestricted" right of access was qualified with re-
gards to uplands.
It is true that the private ownership of the shore may pre-
vent access to the navigable waters of the bay, but so does
the private ownership of the uplands prevent access to
the shore and to the navigable waters in the same sense
and to the same extent. This, however, is a minor and
temporary inconvenience for which our laws and the laws
of all civilized states provide an ample remedy. By the
exercise of the right of eminent domain all necessary
means of access from the uplands to the water front may
be condemned for the public use .... And there is no
injustice in requiring this compensation to be made to the
grantee of shore lands when his right to such lands is in
other respects valid in law; for, like other holders of title
derived from the state, he is presumed to have given
what, at the time of the grant was deemed a fair
equivalent for the land granted.8
Thus, regardless of whether public access is precluded by pri-
vate ownership of uplands or validly granted tidelands, the
80. 118 Cal. at 169, 50 P. at 280.
81. Id. at 182, 50 P. at 285.
82. Id. at 172, 50 P. at 281.
83. Id. at 185, 50 P. at 286 (emphasis added).
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power of eminent domain must be utilized to provide public
access.
Ten years later, the Bolsa Land decision reaffirmed the
rule announced in Oakland Waterfront in a different, more
timely, factual context. There, plaintiff appealed the trial
court's denial of a preliminary injunction to restrain defen-
dants from trespassing on a large oceanfront tract of land
which was used by the Bolsa Chica Gun Club members.
Wholly enclosed within this tract of land was Bolsas Bay, an
estuary subject to tidal action, and its tributary sloughs." The
trespass complained of involved the defendants' destruction
of plaintiff's fences and their entrance into the enclosure by
both land and water for the purpose of hunting waterfowl.
With regard to the propriety of defendants' overland access
routes the court stated, "it is not asserted, and, indeed, it
would require much rashness and temerity to assert that the
public has a right to invade and cross private lands to reach
navigable waters . . -85Left without overland access, defen-
dants claimed that the public was entitled to access on one of
the tributory sloughs called the "Freeman River," as it consti-
tuted a navigable stream flowing into Bolsas Bay.86 But the
Bolsa Land court found little difficulty in rejecting the lower
court's implied finding of navigability, for the "Freeman
River" was nothing more than a drainage ditch which was in-
capable of navigation by even a light skiff.87 Without a navi-
gable stream by which to gain access to the waters of Bolsas
Bay, the court was not compelled to reach the question of the
navigability of the bay. The court found that:
Whether or not' Bolsas Bay ever was, or, if it ever was,
whether it is now, part of the navigable waters of the
state, defendants certainly have no right to invade private
property to gain access thereto. If to approach such wa-
ters a right of way becomes necessary over private lands,
such right of way does not run to the public with the use
of such waters. It must be condemned and paid for by
the public, as must any other right of way for public
use.
88
84. 151 Cal. at 255, 258-59, 90 P. at 532, 534.
85. Id. at 259, 90 P. at 534.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 259-60, 90 P. at 534.
88. Id. at 260, 90 P. at 534-35 (emphasis added).
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The holdings of Oakland Waterfront and Bolsa Land are
consistent with the cases limiting the interpretation of section
4 to lands subject to the public tidelands trust.89 Some skepti-
cism in the weight of these authorities has been expressed be-
cause they "did not consider the effect of Article XV, section
2 of the Constitution on the general law."90 To be sure, the
Oakland Waterfront decision dealt with the validity of a pre-
1897 tideland grant. However, if as one commentator suggests,
section 4 was merely a restatement of the already existing
common law trust,9" then the Oakland Waterfront court was
fully cognizant of the restrictions on the state's power to
alienate trust lands where such a disposition would fail to pre-
serve public access to. navigable waters.'2 Moreover, recent
statements by the California courts on the extent of the
public navigational servitude" clearly indicate that the failure
of the Bolsa Land court to specifically address the impact of
section 4 was because the section did not apply.'4
The availability of the remedy of eminent domain is also
specifically guaranteed by section 1 of article X (formerly arti-
cle IV, section 1) of the constitution to all frontages to naviga-
ble waters." The implication to be drawn from the simultane-
ous enactment of section 1 is evident. If the state desires to
acquire access to navigable waters through lands which came
into private ownership prior to the adoption of the constitu-
tion then the eminent domain powers of the state must be
exercised regardless of whether access is sought over uplands
or public trust lands.6 The closing remarks of Colonel James
Ayers, the Chairman of the Committee on Harbors, Tide Wa-
89. See note 60 supra.
90. 41 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 39, 41 (1963).
91. Parker, supra note 40, at 171. See text accompanying notes 61-62 supra.
92. 118 Cal. at 172, 190, 50 P. at 281, 288.
93. Colberg, Inc. v. California, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 420, 424-25, 432 P.2d 3, 11, 13-14,
62 Cal. Rptr. 401, 409, 411-14 (1967) (the state servitude on lands riparian or littoral
to navigable waters does not extend to cases involving the actual physical invasion
upon such lands); Bohn v. Albertson, 107 Cal. App. 2d 738, 757, 238 P.2d 128, 141
(1951) (the public may use navigable floodwaters for public trust purposes so long as
they do so without trespassing on the lands underlying such floodwaters).
94. Forestier v. Johnson, 164 Cal. 24, 39, 127 P. 156, 162 (1912) ("The effect of
the constitutional provision [article X, section 41 was not mentioned or involved in
that case.").
95. "The right of eminent domain is hereby declared to exist in the State to all
frontages on the navigable waters of this State." CAL. CONST. art. X, § 1 (formerly art.
Xv, § 1).
96. See text accompanying note 83 supra.
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ters and Navigable Streams, to the constitutional delegates
during the final debate on former article XV emphasizes the
limited applicability of the article and any liberal construction
which might be afforded section 4 at a later date:
Gentlemen have gone so far as to even say that this arti-
cle, if engrafted upon the Constitution, will interfere with
vested rights. How it can have any retroactive effect the
gentlemen have not told us, and I cannot see. The gen-
tleman from Matin said, with reference to his land bor-
dering on the bay, that under this article if he had a
wharf or bulkhead on his tidelands that he would be com-
pelled to give it up or free access to it to whoever should
ask it. It is not so. The only way in which access can be
had over his lands to navigable water, is in the usual
way, and for a public use, and in no other way, and that
is the principle which underlies this Act.' 7
The two stumbling blocks addressed above are formidable
impediments to the State Commission's fallback position'8 on
the question of whether the legislature went too far in enact-
ing the access policies of the Act. Recent judicial interpreta-
tion of section 4 by the California Supreme Court in Gion v.
City of Santa Cruz" signals the heightened awareness of the
counterveiling considerations which would be at work if courts
were to construe the section as a legislative basis for the en-
actments. While noting that section 4 established "a clearly
ennunciated public policy. . . in favor of allowing the public
access to shoreline areas,"100 the court expressed the following
caveat: "Although article XV section 2 may be limited to
some extent by the United States Constitution it clearly indi-
cates that we should encourage public use of shoreline areas
whenever that can be done consistently with the federal con-
stitution." 10 1 Whatever the interpretation adhered to by the
courts, if the State Commission's position is adopted, then the
access policies will surely constitute the most liberal construc-
tion of section 4 to date.
97. 3 Constitutional Debates, supra note 50, at 1481 (emphasis added).
98. See text accompanying note 73 supra.
99. 2 Cal. 3d 39, 465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970).
100. Id. at 42, 465 P.2d at 58, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 170.
101. Id. at 43, 465 P.2d at 59, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
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IV. STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO REQUIRE THE PROVISION OF
PUBLIC ACCESSWAYS
A. Section 30212(a)-Authority to Require Dedications
Section 30212(a) is the only operative provision in the Act
which conceivably authorizes the commissions to require the
provision of public accessways as a precondition to develop-
ment between the sea and the nearest public road.""' A review
of the Act demonstrates that it is the only section which con-
tains any dedication language. In pertinent part, section
30212(a) provides:
Public access from the nearest public roadway to the
shoreline and along the coast shall be provided in new de-
velopment projects except where (1) it is inconsistent
with public safety, military security needs, or the protec-
tion of fragile coastal resources, (2) adequate access exists
nearby, or (3) agriculture would be adversely affected.
Dedicated accessway shall not be required to be opened
to public use until a public agency or private association
agrees to accept responsibility for maintenance and liabil-
ity of the accessway. 10"
Developers have argued that the language of section
30212(a) does not specifically authorize the commissions to re-
quire the developer to dedicate accessways or pay fees in lieu
thereof as a condition to development. 10 In advancing this
argument they point out the three apparent weaknesses of
section 30212(a): 1) it fails to state who is to provide access in
new development projects; 2) it fails to state how access is to
be provided, leaving it unclear whether the developer can be
102. Section 30210 is
both a statement as to the tremendous importance the Legislature has
placed on the attainment of public access to the sea in the Act, and a
direction from it that where access was to be provided under other pro-
visions of the Act, the mandate of article 10, section 4 of the Constitu-
tion requires that this access . . . should be maximized consistent with
the provisos listed therein.
Calif. Coastal Comm'n Memorandum, supra note 23, at 70 (emphasis in original).
Likewise, section 30211 refrains from any delegation of access conditioning pow-
ers but attempts to define the scope of the public's right of access to the sea where
acquired by prescription or legislative authorization in article X, section 4 of the Cali-
fornia Constitution. See 1979 AccEss GUIDELINS, supra note 67, at 2-3.
103. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30212(a) (West Supp. 1980) (emphasis added).
104. Pacific Legal Foundation Memorandum, supra note 24, at 13; Benton
Memorandum, supra note 24, at 26.
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required to dedicate accessways, pay fees in lieu of dedication,
or both; and, 3) it is silent on the issue of whether the com-
missions are required to compensate individuals who provide
access. 105 They contend that if the legislature intended to
delegate such powers, it could have done so in specific terms,
citing section 27403 of Proposition 20,106 and section 66478.11
of the Government Code107 as examples of where the legisla-
ture has explicitly authorized the exaction of public access
from developers. 0 8 Developers conclude that the legislature
contemplated the acquisition of access only by local agencies
under subdivision map approval,' 0' and by the State Coastal
Conservancy through the exercise of eminent domain powers
pursuant to the State Coastal Conservancy Act of 1976.110
The developers' claims are persuasive to the extent that
no discernable legislative intent is apparent upon a reading of
105. Benton Memorandum, supra note 24, at 25. In an unpublished letter opin-
ion, the Attorney General also noted the Act's silence on the right of compensation:
The act is silent with respect to giving compensation to the owner-appli-
cant for giving the access right. This is a possible source of attack upon
the constitutionality of the act if it is interpreted, as we do interpret it,
to authorize the regional commissions to require such access as a condi-
tion to issuing a development permit.
Cal. Att'y Gen. Letter Op. No. 50-73/49, at 8 (Sept. 27, 1974).
106. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 27403 (West 1977) (repealed 1977 by CAL. PUB. RES.
CODE § 27650 (West Supp. 1980)), provided in part: "All permits shall be subject to
reasonable terms and conditions in order to ensure: (a) Access to publicly owned or
used beaches, recreation areas, and natural reserves is increased to the maximum ex-
tent possible by appropriate dedication."
107. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 66478.11(a) (West Supp. Pamph. 1966-1979) provides
in part:
No local agency shall approve either the tentative or final map of any
subdivision fronting the coastline or shoreline which subdivision does
not provide or have available reasonable public access by fee or ease-
ment from public highways to land below the ordinary high water mark
on any ocean coastline or bay shoreline within or at a reasonable dis-
tance from the subdivision.
108. Benton Memorandum, supra note 24, at 26-27.
109. See note 107 supra.
110. Benton Memorandum, supra note 24, at 25; Pacific Legal Foundation
Memorandum, supra note 24, at 16. The State Coastal Conservancy is a division of
the Resources Agency of California. It was created by the State Legislature in 1976 to
help protect coastal resources in the coastal zone through a variety of planning, ac-
quisition, and development techniques. Program areas include the provision of public
accessways. In order to carry out this program the Conservancy is empowered to plan
for, buy, sell, or develop land and provide grants to the State Public Works Board
which was granted the power of eminent domain for public accessway condemnation.
See generally CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 31000-31405 (West 1977 & Supp. 1980).
418 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21
section 30212(a). 1'1 The crux of the developers' argument is
that the three weaknesses of the provision render it vague and
ambiguous, thus demonstrating that the legislature chose not
to accord the commissions the power to require developers to
provide access as a condition to obtaining approval of a
coastal development permit. However, this reasoning ignores
the legislative history of section 30212(a). An examination of
the legislative history"' suggests that the three weaknesses
111. Three assumptions must be made before one can conclude that section
30212 authorizes the commissions to require the dedication of public accessways as a
condition to development. First, that the first sentence of section 30212(a), incorpo-
rates by reference the dedication language found in the second sentence of section
30212(a). Developers argue that the dedication language relates only to the responsi-
bility of maintaining accessways. Second, that dedication of accessway is not a volun-
tary act on the part of the coastal developer. Third, that section 30212 is to be read in
conjunction with section 30607, which appears in a latter chapter of the Coastal Act
and essentially permits the commissions to condition development. Here lies the
center of the controversy. There is no conditioning language in section 30212. In this
regard, the trial judge in Isthmus Landowners Ass'n v. California Coastal Comm'n,
No. 229879 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. 1978), found that neither section 30607
nor any other provision in the Coastal Act authorizes the commissions to impose a
mandatory dedication requirement as a condition of issuing a coastal development
permit. But see text accompanying note 117 infra.
112. The original coastal bill, S.B. 1579, was essentially an attempt to incorpo-
rate the policies and recommendations of the Coastal Plan. California Research, State
Coastal Report (February 17, 1979). Section 30274 of that bill was copied almost ver-
batim from Policy 123 of the Coastal Plan, quoted below in substantial part. The in
lieu fee language of Policy 123a was copied verbatim. Section 30274, together with the
entire public access article of the original coastal bill was deleted in its first amend-
ment by the State Senate. S.B. 1579, Reg. Sess. 1976-1977 (April 19, 1976). An
amended version of that same article eventually became the present public access
article of the Coastal Act. S.B. 1277, Reg. Sess. 1976-1977 (August 12, 1976). Amend-
ments made to the article and specifically to section 30212 largely reflect the legisla-
ture's dissatisfaction with the in lieu fee language of Policy 123a and not with the
access dedication language of Policy 123a & b. In this regard, the absence of any
reference to in lieu fees in section 30212 should be contrasted with the inclusion of
the dedication language of the last sentence of Policy 123b. Section 30212 is best
viewed as a merging of an amended version of the first sentence of Policy 123a and
the last sentence of Policy 123b with the legislature's conscious rejection only of Pol-
icy 123a's in lieu fee language.
Policy 123a recommended in pertinent part that:
New developments shall provide public accessways to the shoreline ex-
cept in those individual cases where it is determined that public access
is inappropriate . . . . In developments where the provision of a public
accessway is determined to be inappropriate, the project sponsor shall
pay 'in lieu fees' . . . to a fund for the acquisition, maintenance, and
operation of public access at a suitable location elsewhere.
CAL. COASTAL ZONE CONSERVATION COMM'NS, COASTAL PLAN 154 (1975).
Policy 123b recommended in pertinent part that:
[Iun private developments public access shall be ensured (1) either by
dedication of fee title or an easement for the reserved accessway to a
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are attributable to the compromises that were struck in the
senate in an effort to excise the in lieu fee dedication scheme
proposed by the State Commission. Without a conscious effort
on the part of the Legislature to remove the land dedication
scheme, the better view would be that section 30212(a) does
authorize the dedication of accessways as a condition to devel-
opment. Conversely, the absence of any reference to in lieu
fees in section 30212(a) and the legislative history of that sec-
tion strongly suggest that the commissions do not have the
authority to require the payment of fees in lieu of access
dedication.11 8
The ofily material difference between section 27403 of
Proposition 20114 and section 30212(a) is the absence of the
conditioning language which is found in the former section:
"[A]II permits shall be subject to reasonable terms and condi-
tions. ' 115 Following the developers' logic, this language saves
public agency, or (2) by the recording of a deed restriction, at the own-
er's option. Dedicated accessways shall not be required to be opened to
public use until a public agency or private association agrees to accept
responsibility for maintenance and liability for the accessway.
Id. at 155.
113. Neither the State Commission nor the six Regional Commissions presently
require the payment of fees in lieu of access dedication as a condition to development
in the coastal zone. But cf. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 30610.3 (West Supp. 1980), which
allows the State Coastal Conservancy to purchase accessways from in lieu public ac-
cess fees exacted from lot owners in subdivided areas in limited circumstances. Not-
withstanding the lack of statutory authority in the Coastal Act, the State Commisson
has "instructed" local governments to incorporate such a scheme in their respective
LCP's. Letter from Paul Jensen, Assistant Planner for the City of Pacifica to author
(Jan. 31, 1980). Responding to this advice, San Mateo County and the City of Pacifica
have already implemented provisions in their LCP's which would authorize the exac-
tion of in lieu access dedication fees. San Mateo County, Local Plan Hearing Draft,
Shoreline Access Component (Nov. 1979); City of Pacifica, Local Coastal Plan, Beach
Access (1979).
Before final certification of any LCP which includes provisions similar to those
adopted by San Mateo County and the City of Pacifica, city and county officials
should address whether such revenue raising measures violate the prohibitions of
Proposition 13. Specifically, do fees in lieu of access dedication fall within the "spe-
cial taxes" meaning of article XIIIA, section 4 of the California Constitution and thus
require approval from two-thirds of the qualified electors of the respective city or
county? See generally CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 4; Mills v. County of Trinity, 108
Cal. App. 3d 656, 166 Cal. Rptr. 674 (1980); 62 Ops. Cal. Att'y Gen. 254 (1979) (devel-
opment fees in lieu of land dedication for schools are "special taxes"); 62 Ops. Cal.
Att'y Gen. 663 (1979) (development fees for local improvements are not "special
taxes"); 62 Ops. Cal. Att'y Gen. 673 (1979) (development fees in lieu of building low
and moderate income housing are "special taxes").
114. See note 106 supra.
115. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 27403 (West 1977) (repealed 1977 by CAL. PUB. Ras.
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the commissions from an allegation that they are required to
compensate developers who dedicated access under Proposi-
tion 20.16 However, the failure of the legislature to include
this language within section 30212(a) should not be fatal to a
finding that this section incorporates by reference the condi-
tioning language found in section 30607:
Any permit that is issued or any development or action
approved on appeal, pursuant to this chapter [Chapter 7,
Development Controls], shall be subject to reasonable
terms and conditions in order to ensure that such devel-
opment or action will be in accordance with the provi-
sions of this division [the Act]. 117
While section 30607 appears in a later chapter than section
30212, under its express terms, the conditioning language ap-
plies to any permit issued under Chapter 7. Under section
30601 of Chapter 7, every applicant proposing a development
between the sea and the nearest public road is required to ob-
tain a coastal development permit from the appropriate com-
mission."' Thus, the necessary connection between section
30607 and 30212 seems to be satisfied with the access condi-
tioning language of 30607 incorporated by reference into sec-
tion 30212(a). As a result, section 27403 of Proposition 20 and
section 30212(a) are materially the same provisions. Yet, the
Foundation maintains that the former section "explicitly di-
rected that the coastal development permits be issued on con-
dition that the applicant dedicate rights of public access,"
while the latter does not.119 Such a position seems both anom-
alous and inconsistent with the express wording of section
30607.
CODE (West Supp. 1980) § 27650). See note 106 supra.
116. A permit subject to reasonable terms and conditions is viewed as an exer-
cise of the state's regulatory power to regulate reasonably the use of property for the
protection of the general welfare, commonly referred to as the state's police power. 11
E. McQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CoR'ORATIONS § 3204 (3d ed. 1964). An exer-
cise of this power does not recognize a right to compensation as does an exercise of
the power of eminent domain. Id.
117. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30607 (West 1977).
118. Id. § 30601 provides that "a coastal development permit shall be obtained
• ..for any . . . developments between the sea and the first public road paralleling
the sea . .. ."
119. Pacific Legal Foundation Memorandum, supra note 24, at 14.
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B. Statutory Limitations on the Commissions' Authority to
Require Dedications
Notwithstanding the general authority of the commis-
sions to condition development, three prohibitions appear to
limit the authority delegated in section 30212(a). 120 First, the
commissions are restricted to conditioning "new development
projects." While both the commissions and developers agree
that the commissions' regulatory power is limited to condi-
tioning "new development projects," a controversy has arisen
as to what constitutes a "new development project." The term
"new development projects" was left undefined in the Coastal
Act. Second, the commissions are expressly prohibited from
requiring dedications where public access is inappropriate.
Access is inappropriate in three situations: "where (1) it is in-
consistent with public safety, military security needs, or the
protection of fragile coastal resources, (2) adequate access ex-
ists nearby, or (3) agriculture would be adversely affected.""1 "
Under the rule of statutory construction that exceptions in
statutes are to be strictly construed,22 these three exceptions
to the access requirements of section 30212(a) are best viewed
as absolute prohibitions on the commissions' authority to re-
quire the dedication of public accessway easements.2 8 Lastly,
120. These limitations exist aside from the federal and state constitutional
limits on the state's exercise of its police power. For a discussion of the potential
constitutional issues raised in California's compulsory dedication cases see Heyman &
Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Community Costs on New
Suburban Residents through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119 (1964); John-
son, Constitutionality of Subdivision Control Exactions: The Quest for a Rationale,
52 CORNELL L.Q. 871 (1967); Bowden, Legal Battles on the California Coast: A Re-
view of the Rules, 2 COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT J. 273 (1975); Note, Taking Without
Compensation Through Compulsory Dedication-New Horizons for California Land
Use Law, Loy. L.A. L. REv. 218 (1972); Note, Public Access to Beaches, 22 STAN. L.
REv. 564 (1970).
121. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30212 (West Supp. 1980).
122. National City v. Fritz, 33 Cal. 2d 635, 636, 204 P.2d 7, 9 (1949); Merchants
Nat'l Bank v. Continental Nat'l Bank, 98 Cal. App. 523, 533, 277 P. 354, 358 (1929).
See, e.g., Morris v. Williams, 67 Cal. 2d 733, 748, 433 P.2d 697, 707, 63 Cal. Rptr. 689,
699 (1967) (an administrative agency may not alter or amend enabling legislation or
impair its scope).
123. The State Commission position, as reflected in their Access Guidelines, is
that the public access policies and provisions of the Act should be liberally construed
so that access to the shoreline should "always be attainable." 1980 Accass GUIDE-
LINES, supra note 21, at 1. The language of the constitutional enactment, however,
clearly states that it is the legislature, not the State Commission, who is given the
mandate to construe the enactment liberally. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
1981]
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the commissions' authority is seemingly restricted to requiring
"on site" dedications. Developers argue here that the wording
of section 30212(a) is significant.12 4 In the phrase "[p]ublic ac-
cess ... shall be provided in new development projects,' 25
they contend that the word "in" is "used in the geographical
sense meaning that access shall be provided within the geo-
graphical confines of the new development projects."' 2 This
strict interpretation of the word "in" is favorable to an inter-
pretation which would allow the commissions to require "off-
site" dedications.127
The legislature's conscious rejection of the in lieu dedica-
tion scheme proposed by the State Commission, 28 a scheme
which would have authorized the commission to require "off-
site" access, stands for a similiar rejection of "off-site" dedica-
tion measures. To require "off-site" dedications would essen-
tially mean that "on-site" dedications were inappropriate,
thus bringing the development within one of the three excep-
tions listed in section 30212(a)."9 Thus, the commissions do
not appear to have the authority to require "off-site" dedica-
tions on unaffected parcels of land owned by the applicant
seeking approval of his coastal development permit.
V. EXCEEDING THE AUTHORITY OF SECTION 30212
In spite of the apparent limitations of section 30212, the
commissions have required "off-site" dedication or mitigation
measures,3 0 dedications where access was inappropriate,''
and dedications where the proposed project could not conceiv-
ably be deemed a "new development project."'' 2 The State
Commission's nonobservance of the three prohibitions of sec-
tion 30212 stems, to a large degree, from the standards and
policies of the Commission's Statewide Interpretive Guide-
lines on public access. The liberties taken in the guidelines
indicate that the Commission has overreached the access con-
124. Georgia-Pacific Memorandum, supra note 24, at 78.
125. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 30212 (West Supp. 1980).
126. Georgia-Pacific Memorandum, supra note 24, at 78..
127. For the Commission's position see note 123 supra.
128. See note 112 supra.
129. See text accompanying note 121 supra.
130. Conversation with Don Neuwirth, Public Access Program Manager, Cali-
fornia Coastal Commission (Jan. 15, 1980).
131. L.A. Times, May 20, 1980, at 24, col. 1. See note 65 infra.
132. See text accompanying notes 39, 170-189 infra.
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ditioning powers delegated in section 30212. Such an exercise
would be in direct contravention of the enabling provision
which states that "such guidelines shall not supercede, enlarge
or diminish the powers or authority of any regional commis-
sion, the commission, or any public agency."
83
A. New Development Projects
Although the term "new development projects" cannot be
precisely defined, it seems clear that it is to be distinguished
from the all inclusive term "development." ' " Prior to a recent
amendment to section 30212,135 the State Commission failed
to maintain any distinction between the two terms. It condi-
tioned all "development" upon the dedication of access, in-
cluding ministerial repair and maintenance activities and the
reconstruction of single family residences destroyed by natu-
ral disaster. In response to the State Commission's actions,
the legislature amended section 30212 by adding subsection
(b). Subsection (b) exempted four types of developments from
the access dedication requirements of section 30212(a).1 6 The
problem remaining is that the State Commission does not rec-
ognize any exceptions to the term "new development projects"
other than those established by the legislature in subsection
(b). 37
133. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30620(a)(3) (West 1977).
134. Id. § 30106. This section broadly defines development as "the placement or
erection of any solid material or structure . . . grading . . . any materials . . . con-
struction, reconstruction, demolition, or alteration of the size of any structure ...."
Structure is defined in the same section as including "any building, road, pipe, flume,
conduit, siphon, aqueduct, telephone line, and electrical power transmission and dis-
tribution line." Id.
135. A.B. 643, Reg. Sess. 1979-80 (Feb. 26, 1979) (enacted as 1979 Cal. Stats.,
ch. 919, § 3, at 3505).
136. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 30212(b) (West Supp. 1980) recognizes four types of
projects or developments which are not to be characterized as "new development
projects" for purposes of section 30212: (1) replacement of any structure, other than a
public works facility, which does not exceed by more than 10 percent the floor area,
height, or bulk of the destroyed structure as the destroyed structure; (2) demolition
or reconstruction of a single family-residence which does not increase by more than
10% the floor area, height or bulk of the former structure and which is located in the
same location as the former structure; (3) remodeling or improvement of a structure
which does not block or impede public access, change the intensity of its use, or in-
crease by more than 10% the floor area, height and bulk of the structure; and (4) any
repair and maintenance activity which requires a coastal development permit pursu-
ant to section 30610 unless the commissions find that such activity will have an ad-
verse impact on lateral public access along the beach.
137. In attempting to define the term "new development project" in § 30212 the
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The Pacific Legal Foundation has recently challenged the
State Commission's Access Guideline's definition of "new
development projects" on the grounds that it erodes the dis-
tinction which should be maintained between the terms "de-
velopment" and "new development projects."1 ' The State
Commission's Access Guidelines effectively define "new devel-
opment projects" as synonymous with "development" minus
the four limited exceptions established by the legislature in
subsection (b) of 30212.1" The Foundation contends that the
Access Guideline's definition of new development projects "by
incorporating all activities delineated in section 30106 (defin-
ing development), with minor exceptions, has obliterated the
legislative distinction contained in the Coastal Act. '140 The
Foundation concludes that the State Commission has there-
fore exceeded its statutory authority by promulgating Access
Guidelines in conflict with the Coastal Act.141
The State Commission's position, as reflected in their
guidelines, is that the legislature, by specifying certain types
of development that are not to be construed as "new develop-
ment projects," meant to imply that all development not
fitting within subsection (b) are necessarily new development
projects.142 This position is not warranted upon an examina-
tion of the legislative history of subsection (b) of section
30212 and a review of the usage, scope, and meaning of the
terms "new development project," "new development," "de-
State Commission has had considerable difficulty with the word "project." The end
result was that the term "new development project" was equated with the term "new
development" resulting in the removal of the word "project." Going one step further,
the State Commission dropped the word "new" from the term "new development
project" when it equated that term with the all inclusive term "development":
[U]nless one of the three states exceptions (§ 30212(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3)]
all 'new development' located between the first public roadway and the
shoreline must provide for public access. For purposes Of this section,
project is interpreted to mean any activity constituting 'new develop-
ment' as defined below [any development except for those developments
recognized in § 30212(b)]. 'New development' as used in Section 30212
of the Coastal Act, includes all projects included in the definition in sec-
tion 30106 of the Coastal Act, except in the following cases [the four
types of development set out in § 30212(b)].
1979 ACCESS GUIDELINES, supra note 67, at 3.
138. Pacific Legal Foundation Memorandum, supra note 24, at 47.
139. See note 137 supra.
140. Pacific Legal Foundation Memorandum, supra note 24, at 54-55.
141. Id.
142. See text accompanying note 179 infra.
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velopment project," and "project" in the Coastal Act.
1. The Calvo Bill and Subsection (b) of Section 30212
In 1979, a number of bills were introduced in the State
Legislature proposing revisions of the Coastal Act. Assembly
Bill 643,1'1 authored by Assemblyman Calvo, added subsec-
tion (b) to section 30212, designating four types of develop-
ment which are not to be characterized as "new development
projects" for purposes of section 30212(a). As demonstrated
by the legislative history,4 subsection (b) was not intended
to define "new development projects" as any "development"
not coming within the parameters of subsection (b). Sub-
section (b) was the Legislature's attempt to set out what types
of "development" were free from access requirements of sec-
tion 30212(a) because of their ministerial impact on public
access.
145
143. A.B. 643, Reg. Seas. 1979-80 (Feb. 26, 1979) (enacted as 1979 Cal. Stats.,
ch. 919, § 3, at 3505).
144. When the Calvo Bill, A.B. 643, was first introduced it did not contain any
language which amended section 30212. A.B. 643, Reg. Sess. 1979-80 (Feb. 26, 1979).
The Bill was then amended to incorporate a proposed addition to section 30212 bor-
rowing those additions from the Levine Bill, A.B. 117, Reg. Sess. 1978-79 (1979). Af-
ter the amendment the Calvo Bill explicitly defined "new development project" as
"any development, as defined in section 30106" with four exceptions. A.B. 643, Reg.
Sass. 1978-79 (May 16, 1979). See note 136 supra. If the Calvo Bill had been passed
in this form, then the legislature would have enacted the definition of "new develop-
ment projects" which the State Commission adopts in their Access Guidelines. How-
ever, after the sponsors of the Calvo Bill discovered the "full implications" of such a
definition an author's amendment was introduced removing any reference to § 30106
and rejecting the equation of the term "new development project" with the term "de-
velopment." Declaration of Thomas H. Willoughby at 5, Georgia-Pacific v. California
Coastal Comm'n, No. 744,590 (San Francisco County Super. Ct. 1980) [hereinafter
cited as Willoughby Declaration]. Under the author's amendment only the reference
to section 30106 was removed so that the four types of development previously recog-
nized as exceptions to the term "new development projects" were retained. A.B. 643,
with the author's amendment, passed both the Senate and the Assembly by a com-
bined vote of 98-2 and was subsequently signed by the Governor.
145. An affidavit by Thomas H. Willoughby, Chief Consultant for the Commit-
tee on Resources, Land Use, and Energy of the California State Assembly is signifi-
cant here. He assisted the author, Mr. Calvo, in the amendment to the Calvo Bill
which removed the language defining "new development" as "any development, as
defined in section 30106 . . . ." In it he stated:
As enacted by the Legislature... A.B. 643 contains no language what-
soever defining or purporting to define either the term 'new develop-
ment' or the term 'new development project.' With respect to said
terms, it was intended that the bill only set forth four types of activity
that were definitely not to be considered within the rubric of 'new devel-
opment.' The bill preserves the status quo ante with respect to the fact
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2. The Significance of Leaving "New Development
Projects" Undefined
While it seems clear that the State Commission's position
on what constitutes a "new development project" is un-
founded, every applicant whose development does not fit
within the limited exceptions of subsection (b) still faces the
likelihood that he will be required to dedicate access as a pre-
condition to development. This leaves coastal developers in a
precarious position; they simply do not know whether their
developments come within the meaning of the term "new de-
velopment projects." Nor is the legislature in a more knowing
position. The legislature seems to know when a development
is not a new development project, but it has elected not to
codify the definition of the all important term. Rather, they
seem more willing to incorporate new exceptions to subsection
(b). Thus, the question that remains is how broadly can the
commissions construe their access conditioning powers before
the legislature perceives a need to delimit those powers.
The formulation of a definition for "new development
projects" will occur largely at the expense of the coastal devel-
oper and the taxpayer. Inevitably, some coastal developers
who feel that their developments do not constitute "new de-
velopment projects" will find themselves in court with pro-
tracted litigation. Other coastal developers, lacking the time
or money to finance such a demanding undertaking will have
no other alternative but to acquiesce in the commissions'
judgment on whether such development is a "new develop-
ment project." As this comment has already demonstrated,
that judgment is unsoundly based. A legal attack against the
State Commission's Access Guidelines has merit but will
probably achieve nothing more than having the State Com-
mission retract its standards on what constitutes a "new de-
velopment project." A more likely scenario has coastal devel-
opers challenging the Commission's characterization of their
development on a case by case basis until it appears all the
exceptions to the application of section 30212(a) are carved
out.
that neither the term 'new development' nor the term 'new development
project' was or is defined anywhere in California Coastal Act.
Willoughby Declaration, supra note 144, at 15.
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3. New Development Projects as Developments Having
a Significant Impact on Public Access
Ultimately, the question of what constitutes a "new de-
velopment project" turns upon an inquiry of the term "new
development project." In determining what the legislature in-
tended by the use of a particular term, courts have looked to




However, the Coastal Act contains no other provision which
employs the term "new development project." As such, the
meaning of the term may best be discerned by reviewing the
usage, scope, and meaning of the terms which make it up:
"new development," "project," and "project development."1 1 7
The use of the term "new development" as opposed to
"development" in several provisions of the Coastal Act in-
dicates that the legislature intended to distinguish the two
terms. '4 Where the term "new development" has been used it
has been associated with development which: 1) creates a
need for public services;149 2) has a potential to degrade highly
scenic areas;150 3) necessitates the provision of extension of
transit services, attracts new residents, or creates a potential
for increased use of coastal access roads; 51 and, 4) is of such a
146. Stillwell v. State Bar, 29 Cal. 2d 119, 123, 173 P. 2d 313, 315 (1946). See
Rosemary Properties, Inc. v. McColgan, 29 Cal. 2d 677, 177 P.2d 755 (1947) (the legis-
lature could not have intended to use a significant word in two different senses in the
same statute).
147. Such an approach is consistent with the general principle of statutory con-
struction that "in the interpretation of statutes, every word, phrase or provision is
presumed to be intended by the Legislature to have meaning and perform a useful
function." Reyna v. City & County of San Francisco, 69 Cal. App. 3d 876, 880, 138
Cal. Rptr. 504, 507 (1977) (quoting Bayer v. Suttle, 23 Cal. App. 3d 361, 364, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 212, 214 (1972). See Moyer v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 10 Cal. 3d 222,
230, 514 P.2d 1224, 1229, 110 Cal. Rptr. 144, 149 (1973).
148. The following words have been used as prefixes to the term "development"
in various sections throughout the Coastal Act: any, new, any new, existing, other,
and permitted. CAL. PuB. RES. CoDe §§ 30236, 30250, 30251, 30412, 30518, 30519,
30715 (West 1977 & Supp. 1980). These same prefixes have been used alternatively
within the same section, intimating that they are designed to give added meaning to
the term "development" and providing a basis for distinguishing "new development"
from "existing development" and "any development." Id. §§ 30250 (new residential,
commercial or industrial development and existing isolated development), 30251 (per-
mitted development, new development, and other development), 30518 (new develop-
ment and any development), and 30519 (any new development and any
development).
149. Id. § 30250 (West Supp. 1980).
150. Id. § 30251.
151. Id. § 30252.
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nature that it has the potential to be structurally unstable,
contribute significantly to erosion, geologic instability, or de-
struction of the development site, air pollution, or impact
energy consumption and vehicle miles traveled.15"
The legislature's insertion of the term "project"152 in sec-
tion 30212 may also be significant in ascertaining the legisla-
tive intent behind the term "new development project." "Pro-
ject" is used sparingly in the Act; either appearing by itself or
within the term "development project." Provisions which use
the term "project" or "development project" indicate that the
terms have been used in connection with: 1) channelizations,
dams, or other substantial alterations of rivers and streams
designed to control floods or provide water to the public;1" 2)
production, storage, transmission, and recovery facilities for
the treatment of water and sewage;155 3) facilities associated
with the activities of ports such as roads or highways within
port boundaries, office and residential buildings, hotels,
motels, commercial fishing facilities, oil refineries, or petro
chemical plants;156 4) developments which amount to major
public works projects or major energy facilities;157 5) a state
university or college.158
The overall impression one gets from the usage, scope,
and the meaning of the terms "new development," "project,"
or "development project," is that the legislature was address-
ing development which has a clear and substantial impact on
coastal resources. It is hard to imagine that the legislature in-
tended to bring the following developments within the pur-
view of the access conditioning powers of the Commission: 1)
remodeling of a house which increases the area, height, or
bulk of a structure by more than 10 percent; 2) replacement of
a shoreline revetment destroyed by a natural disaster where
the replacement would deviate as little as one foot from the
footprint of the destroyed structure; 3) planting of trees,
shrubbery, and other plant life; 4) construction of an unat-
tached tool shed, patio or other miniscule home improvement;
152. d. § 30253.
153. See note 112 supra.
154. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 30236 (West 1977).
155. Id. § 30412.
156. Id. §§ 30620.6, 30715, 30719.
157. Id. § 30601.
158. Id. §§ 30605, 30606.
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or, 5) erection of a single family residence in areas which have
not demonstrated a public need for access. However, all the
above mentioned developments presently come within the
scope of section 30212(a)"8 9 and the Commission stands ready
to attach access conditions to their approval, regardless if they
have a significant impact on public access.
In summary, a workable definition for the term "new
development projects" which is consistent with the nature and
purpose of section 30212(a) is needed for an equitable appli-
cation of the Coastal Act's access policies. Assigning a mean-
ingful definition to the term would resolve much of the con-
troversy surrounding the commissions' aggressive
implementation of the access requirements of section
30212(a). Under the present scheme the commissions simply
have unrestricted discretion when determining what consti-
tutes a "new development project." Indeed, the State Com-
mission's present definition of "new development project," as
reflected in its Access Guidelines, is at odds with the legisla-
tive intent manifested in subsection (b) of section 30212.
Bearing in mind that when the legislature employed the
terms "new development," "project," and "development pro-
ject," it was focusing on the environmental impact of the pro-
posed development. A functional definition which relates the
development to its impact or burden on public access would
be a useful starting point. Additionally, since the legislature
has demonstrated a willingness to exempt certain develop-
ments which typically have a minor impact on public access
from the access policies of the Act,160 a "significant effect" test
might be employed to distinguish a "new development pro-
ject" from other developments. This type of test is also consis-
tent with the Act's usage of the terms "new development,"
"project," and "development project." It is also the same test
employed by public agencies under present statutory and ad-
ministrative rulesi e1 pursuant to the California Environmental
159. See note 136 supra.
160. Id. Cf. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65928 (West 1966) (exempting "ministerial
projects" from the definition of "development project").
161. The state EIR Guidelines, CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, §§ 15000-15192 (1977)
provide in part: "A project as defined in section 15037(1)(a) definition of projects
specified by these guidelines. . . shall not require an Environmental Impact Report
• . . unless it is a project which may have a significant effect on the environment."
Id. § 15070 (emphasis added). The state EIR Guidelines also exempt "ministerial
projects," including building permits from the application of CEQA. Id. § 15073(b).
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Quality Act,"' which requires these agencies to "prepare...
an environmental impact report on any project they propose
to carry out or approve which may have a significant effect on
the environment. 1 6 3 To give added meaning to any functional
definition that is derived, the commissions could be required
to make a specific finding that the proposed project has
placed a significant burden on public access.
B. When is Access Inappropriate?
Section 30212(a) explicitly sets out three circumstances
where access is inappropriate and where the commissions
seemingly have no authority to attach access conditions.'" A
review of the Commission's guidelines reveals that these ex-
ceptions have been somewhat ignored.1e5 The State Commis-
sion's Access Guidelines treat these exceptions as merely
limiting but not precluding the dedication of public access.
Such a stance misconstrues the legislative intent expressed in
the wording of section 30212(a).
Not only has the State Commission treated the three ex-
ceptions as discretionary; it has changed the meaning of the
word "access" in the second exception so as to sidestep the
application of the exception in situations where adequate lat-
eral access exists nearby. The second exception in section
30212(a) prohibits the Commission from conditioning devel-
opment where "adequate access exists nearby." The legisla-
The "Guidelines for Processing Permits for Development Projects" prepared by the
State Office of Planning and Research for state agencies are found in S.A.M. §§ 1070-
1099 (issued pursuant to CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65923). For a discussion of the problems
of interpretation with the terms "projects" and "development project" under CEQA
see Sahm, Project Approval Under the California Environmental Quality Act: It
Always Takes Longer than You Think, 19 SANTA CLARA L. RaV. 579, 600-07 (1979).
162. CAL. PUB. Rzs. CODE §§ 21100-21175 (West 1977 & Supp. 1980).
163. Id. § 21151. See Comment, Exclusionary Zoning: A Project for the Cali-
fornia Environmental Quality Act? 19 SANTA CLARA L. Rav. 777, 791-94 (1979) for a
discussion of the judicial interpretation of CEQA's "significant effect" test.
164. See text accompanying note 121 supra.
165. After listing the three states exceptions to the provision of access require-
ment of § 30212, the State Commission states:
In some instances, these exceptions may merely serve to limit but not
totally preclude the requirement for provisions of public access in new
development projects. Where at all possible, the public right of access
should be preserved. By limiting the location or uses of accessways,
public access and the protection of resources may be found to be
compatible.
1979 Accass GUIDELINES, supra note 68, at 12.
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ture did not distinguish between vertical and lateral access.
Access, as used in the second exception, derives its meaning
from the opening phrase of section 30212(a): "public access
from the nearest public roadway to the shoreline [vertical ac-
cess] and along the coast [lateral access] shall be provided
,...*,,I" However, the State Commission's Access Guidelines
consider only the existence of vertical accessways in determin-
ing when adequate access exists nearby.11 7 Thus, under the
Access Guidelines, if adequate lateral accessway existed in
front of a proposed development project, the Commission
could still require the developer to dedicate a vertical access-
way. Again, this position is clearly contrary to the legislative
intent of section 30212(a).
C. On Site Dedications
Closely connected with the three exceptions in subsection
(a) of section 30212 is the prohibition restricting the commis-
sions' ability to require "on site" dedications. This prohibition
is entirely consistent with and supportive of the three excep-
tions in subsection (a) where the developer is exempted from
providing public accessways. In applying the two prohibitions,
if adequate access exists nearby or access would be inconsis-
tent with public safety, military needs, coastal resources, or
agriculture, then access is inappropriate within the develop-
ment project area. Under section 30212(a), if access is in-
appropriate for the above reasons then the new development
project is exempted from its access requirements.
In an attempt to circumvent the second and third
prohibitions the commissions have required "off-site" dedica-
tions and are now contemplating "off-site" mitigation mea-
sures at the local level. 168 Both practices exceed the limited
166. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30212 (West Supp. 1980).
167. "What constitutes adequate access nearby? The question of whether ade-
quate access exists nearby applies to the siting of vertical accessways." 1979 Acczss
GUIDELINES, supra note 68, at 13. Compare CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 30212(b)(4) (West
Supp. 1980) with the State Commission's Access Guidelines. Section 30212(b)(4) re-
quires the commissions only to consider the repair and maintenance activities' impact
on lateral public access in determining whether the activity qualifies as a "new devel-
opment project," however, the Access Guidelines allow the commissions to consider
only the impact on vertical access.
168. Fees in lieu of access dedication has been proposed as one type of mitiga-
tion measure where public access would be inappropriate within a development. Local
Coastal Program Manual Supplement, supra note 15, at 16.
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authority granted in section 30212.
Requiring "off-site" dedications or mitigation measures
clearly demonstrates the commissions' overly enthusiastic ap-
plication of the Coastal Act's access policies. For example,
suppose an applicant proposes to conduct an agricultural op-
eration on one of his two detached and undeveloped ocean
front parcels. Suppose further that the State Commission con-
cedes that access would be inappropriate along or through the
agricultural operation but decides to require the dedication of
accessways in the remaining undeveloped parcel. As prime
ocean front land, this parcel is desperately needed by the pub-
lic to gain access to a unique stretch of the coastline. Besides
exceeding the "on site" limitation of section 30212(a), there
are two fundamental flaws in the State Commission's logic.
First, the applicant's agricultural development has not gener-
ated an additional need for public access on the remaining
parcel."' 0 Second, access is inappropriate within the agricul-
169. An access condition imposed on the other detached parcel is presumably
valid only where there exists some nexus between the parcel and the public access
needs generated by its development. No California court has upheld a subdivision
exaction or a condition imposed on rezoning, a building permit, or a special use per-
mit as "reasonable" without the existence of some relationship between the proposed
land use and the public needs emanating from that use. The most permissive stan-
dard of reasonableness by which to evaluate the validity of the condition imposed is
found in Associated Homebuilders, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484
P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971). The court upheld
section 11546 of the Government code which authorized a requirement of a dedica-
tion of land or an in lieu fee for park or recreational purposes as a condition to ap-
proval of a subdivision map, stating: "section 11546 can be justified on the basis of a
general public need caused by present and future subdivisions" (emphasis added). Id.
at 638, 484 P.2d at 610, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
The ultimate basis for upholding access conditions as a valid exercise of the
state's police power has been hinged on the general public need for access to the
California coastline. Sea Ranch Ass'n v. California Coastal Comm'n, No. C-74-1320
(N.D. Cal. April 7, 1981). Yet whether public access is a public necessity or a matter
of public convenience is unanswerable without examining the proposed "new develop-
ment project." See note 26 supra. No other land use regulation has been upheld in
California which bestows such a windfall to the public at such a great cost to the
individual property owner. For example, to uphold coastal "exactions" for public ac-
cessways based on a general public need is to no longer require a direct nexus be-
tween the exaction and the proposed subdivision. This signals a dramatic move away
from requiring the "subdivider" to "pay his way" to making him pay for the public's
way. To require the coastal developer to dedicate upland accessways without carefully
relating the public need for the condition or exaction with the proposed development
is to require him to pay a disproportionate share of a public undertaking.
See, e.g., Ayers.v. City Council of Los Angeles, 341 Cal. 2d 31, 42, 207 P.2d 1, 8
(1949) (exaction valid if reasonably related to meet the public needs emanating from
subdivision); Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal. App. 2d 412, 422, 79 Cal.
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tural development so that the applicant's development is ex-
empted from access dedications. Alternatively, if the State
Commission required the above applicant to improve existing
accessways on some other ocean front lot under the guise of a
mitigation measure, such a practice is miscalculated for an ad-
ditional reason. As already demonstrated, section 30212 au-
thorizes only the dedication of accessways. The statute simply
does not mention or imply that the commissions have the
power to require applicants to improve "off-site" accessways
or perform any activity which is purportedly designed to miti-
gate the impact of his development on public access.
D. A Paradigm Case
An example of the State Commission's excessively broad
interpretation of its statutory authority under section 30212 is
found in Georgia-Pacific v. California Coastal Commission.170
Although it was a preguideline application of section 30212,
the conditions imposed are consistent with a reading of the
State Commission's present Access Guidelines and demon-
strate the Commission's disregard of all three of the prohibi-
tions contained in section 30212(a).
In 1978, Georgia-Pacific sought coastal development per-
mits for four separate projects at its log-processing facility lo-
cated at Fort Bragg in northern California. All four projects
were to be undertaken within the ocean front parcel devoted
to Georgia-Pacific's industrial operation-a parcel bounded by
the Pacific Ocean on the west, Elm Street on the north, High-
way 1 on the east, and Noyo Bay and Noyo River on the
south. Georgia-Pacific owned two other ocean front parcels at
Fort Bragg-the Noyo Headlands and the Elm Street parcel.
The Noyo Headlands was immediately south of the Noyo
River so that it was geographically separate from the indus-
trial parcel. The Elm Street parcel was immediately north of
Elm Street and contiguous to the industrial parcel. Both par-
cels remained undeveloped and unrelated to Georgia-Pacific's
industrial lumber operation.
Rptr. 872, 880 (1969) (public needs caused by proposed development is the sine qua
non of the condition's reasonableness); Mid-Way Cabinet Fixture Mfg. v. County of
San Joaquin, 257 Cal. App. 2d 181, 192, 65 Cal. Rptr. 37, 44, (1967) (reasonableness of
condition contingent upon some "real relationship" between the proposed land use
and the condition imposed).
170. No. 744590 (San Francisco Super. Ct. 1980).
19811
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
The first project was the replacement of a dilapidated six
foot wooden fence which surrounded a portion of the indus-
trial area with a six foot chain link security fence. The second
project was the repair of an existing revetment or sea wall
designed to protect several settling ponds from wave action by
the sea. The revetment had been damaged by storm waves
during the prior winter. Georgia-Pacific proposed to repair the
sea wall in order to comply with the waste discharge require-
ments issued by the Water Quality Control Board. The third
project was the construction of a helicopter pad and hangar.
The fourth project was the construction of a forest informa-
tion center for the public on Highway 1.
The Regional Commission unconditionally approved all
four projects finding that adequate public access existed
nearby171 and that in any event public access was "not desir-
able due to the inconsistency with the safety of people in the
industrial plant and the city of Fort Bragg. 17' The Sierra
Club and one private individual appealed the decision of the
Regional Commission to the State Commission.173 On appeal,
the State Commission consolidated all four projects and ulti-
mately attached identical access conditions to the permits is-
sued for each of the projects. In total five conditions were im-
posed. Two of the conditions, a lateral and vertical easement,
were required on the undeveloped parcel north of Elm Street.
The third and fourth conditions, a lateral and vertical ease-
ment, were required on the undeveloped parcel south of Noyo
River. The last condition was that Georgia-Pacific record an
open-ended offer to dedicate an easement for a trail running
along the entire length of the industrial parcel to be accepted
when Georgia-Pacific abandoned the industrial operation.
Georgia-Pacific sought a writ of mandate to compel the
State Commission to grant approval of the coastal develop-
ment permits for the four proposed projects minus the chal-
lenged access conditions. Georgia-Pacific contended, inter
171. Administrative Record Georgia-Pacific, supra note 7, at 97.
172. Id. at 82.
173. Any "aggrieved person" may appeal a Regional Commission's decision to
grant a coastal development permit without access conditions on the grounds that the
development fails to provide adequate physical access. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 30602,
30603, 30625 (West 1977). An "aggrieved person" is anyone "who, in person or
through a representative, appeared at a public hearing of the . . . regional com-
missson in connection with the action appealed." Id. § 30801 (West 1977).
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alia, that the State Commission acted in excess of its statu-
tory authority when it imposed the five dedication conditions
since: 1) none of its four proposed projects were "new devel-
opment projects" for purposes of applying the access require-
ments of section 30212(a), 74 and 2) adequate access existed
nearby within the meaning of section 30212(a).17 5
The trial court found for Georgia-Pacific, concluding that
the four proposed projects were not "new development
projects" within the meaning of section 30212.M6 However, the
State Commission moved for a new trial based on the recent
amendment to section 30212 which added subsection (b). The
State Commission contended that this amendment consti-
tuted "newly discovered evidence, 1 7 justifying a new trial
since it demonstrated that the trial court erred in ruling that
Georgia-Pacific's projects were not "new development
projects. 1 7 8 The State Commission argued that the court
would never have so ruled since:
This statute [amended § 302121 contains a definition of
"new development" not found in the section in its origi-
nal form. The definition excludes certain development
from its purview, thereby including all other develop-
ment, such as that for which Georgia-Pacific sought
coastal permits from the Commission. 7'
The trial court denied the State Commission's motion for a
new trial.180 While the specific grounds for denying the motion
were not given, it seems clear that the State Commission's in-
terpretation of the meaning of the term "new development
project" is at odds with the legislative intent of subsection
(b).181 Additionally, the trial court's initial ruling is both con-
sistent with the premise that "new development projects"
have a significant impact on public access and with an appli-
cation of the three prohibitions of section 30212(a).1 8'
174. Georgia-Pacific Memorandum, supra note 24, at 47.
175. Id. at 54.
176. Memorandum of Intended Decision, Georgia-Pacific v. California Coastal
Comm'n, No. 744590 (San Francisco County Super. Ct. 1980).
177. Georgia-Pacific Memorandum, supra note 24, at 15.
178. Id. at 20-24.
179. Id. at 2.
180. Conversation with Steven Hock, attorney for plaintiffs (March 10, 1980).
The State Commission has subsequently filed for an appeal.
181. See text accompanying notes 143-45 supra.
182. See text accompanying notes 120-29 supra.
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The consolidation and subsequent conditioning of all four
projects is in direct conflict with the first prohibition of sec-
tion 30212(a).1 83 The repair of the security fence and the re-
construction of the sea wall are not "new development
projects" within even the most liberal interpretation of the
term."8 ' By their very nature these projects could not generate
an additional need for public access. Georgia-Pacific was sim-
ply rebuilding what had been there for some time. The public
had never used or desired to use the industrial parcel to gain
access to the coast. As the Regional Commission stated, ade-
quate access existed nearby. Additionally, public access
through a heavy industrial area would be imminently danger-
ous both to the public and to the employees of Georgia-
Pacific.
For public safety reasons, even if the forest center and
the helicopter facilities were correctly deemed "new develop-
ment projects," the second prohibition of section 30212(a)
would exempt those projects from having to provide access.'"
If access is inconsistent with. public safety then access is in-
appropriate and dedications are not required. It is hard to im-
agine circumstances which would present greater dangers to
public safety than a public trail through a log-processing
facility.186
Recognizing the public safety problem with a public ac-
cessway through the industrial parcel, 187 the State Commis-
sion went a step further and triggered the third prohibition of
section 30212(a) by requiring "off-site" dedications. The dedi-
cations required in the Noyo Headlands parcel are inconsis-
183. See text accompanying notes 134-63 supra.
184. See note 137 supra.
185. See text accompanying notes 164-65 supra.
186. The industrial parcel was subject to heavy industrial use, including heavy
machinery, lumber mills, log decks, drying stacks, and an airstrip. In proceedings
before the Regional Commission the Commission found that "[slafety from the fire
hazards cannot be assumed. Safety requirements around the airstrip could not be
assumed with public access along Noyo Headlands." Administrative Record Georgia-
Pacific, supra note 7, at 82.
187. The following remark by Commissioner Andresen during proceedings
before the State Commission is illustrative:
I'm wondering, since this company has so many vast land holdings, if it
wouldn't be possible to create an access route some other place that
would be unobtrusive for them and possibly more interesting and harm-




tent with the "on-site" dedication requirement of section
30212(a). By requiring such dedications the State Commission
conceded that access was inappropriate in the industrial par-
cel-the only parcel where any additional need for public ac-
cess could have been conceivably generated by the construc-
tion of the helicopter facilities or forest center. It further
stands to reason that if access was inappropriate in the indus-
trial parcel then Georgia-Pacific projects had not created an
additional need for public access thereby making their
projects immune from the conditioning powers of the State
Commission.88 The required vertical and lateral access condi-
tions imposed on the Elm Street parcel to the north should be
classified as "off-site" for purposes of section 30212. While the
parcel was not technically geographically separate from the
industrial parcel, it remained unrelated to Georgia-Pacific's
logging operation. Indeed, the parcel was undeveloped.
In summary, all five conditions would seem to exceed the
limited authority of section 30212(a). The conditions imposed
on the fence repair and the revetment reconstruction clearly
are not "new development projects" within the meaning of
section 30212(a). The conditions imposed on the construction
of the helicopter facilities and forest center are presumably
invalid for three reasons. One, as stated by the Regional Com-
mission, adequate access existed nearby. Two, providing ac-
cess "in the new development project" area, which was an
area restricted to Georgia-Pacific's industrial operations,
would be inconsistent with public safety. Three, the Commis-
sions are not authorized to require the dedication of access-
ways "off-site" from the development area. Such a practice
would effectively sidestep one of the three listed exceptions of
section 30212(a) that "[p]ublic access. . . shall be provided in
new development projects except where. . . it is inconsistent
with public safety."1 8
VI. CONCLUSION
Many coastal developers and public interest groups have
criticized the commissions' aggressive implementation of the
access provisions of the Coastal Act. This criticism has re-
cently resulted in a number of lawsuits which have focused on
188. See note 168 supra.
189. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 30212 (West Supp. 1980).
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the scope of the public's constitutional right of access and on
the commissions' application of the access requirements of
section 30212.
An examination of article X, section 4 of the California
Constitution reveals that it cannot provide the access policies
with the constitutional underpinning for a right of public ac-
cess across privately owned uplands. The public's constitu-
tional right of access is limited to an easement over public
trust lands and does not extend over upland areas. There are
also significant problems, outlined above, in utilizing the en-
actment's legislative mandate as the legislative basis for the
access policies. Although the courts have generally been recep-
tive to arguments in favor of expanding public access, we
should be mindful of the concerns of the 1879 convention del-
egates who clearly contemplated the exercise of eminent do-
main powers to obtain accessways over uplands, and tide and
submerged lands freed of the public trust.
Besides authorizing the commissions to require the dedi-
cation of accessways, the express wording of section 30212 ap-
pears to limit that authority in three respects. The commis-
sions are apparently restricted to: conditioning "new
development projects;" requiring "on-site" accessways; and
exacting access conditions where "on-site" access is appropri-
ate. A review of the State Commission's Access Guidelines
reveals that these prohibitions have not been followed. Much
of the controversy that surrounds the Access Guidelines cen-
ters on its definition of what constitutes a "new development
project." This comment has examined that definition and
found it to be inconsistent with the meaning of the term and
the legislative intent of section 30212. A definition employing
a "significant effect" test would far better implement the leg-
islative intent of section 30212 and the legitimate concerns of
coastal developers.
Kevin A. Johnson
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